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Many river basins are trans-boundary. Disputes over trans-boundary river 
water resource allocation are well documented. Different countries within 
the same river basin might have different interests in the water use. 
Externality issues are often present, for example, upstream countries 
might pollute the river carelessly without taking into account downstream 
countries’ water use. In this thesis, we firstly investigate the efficiency and 
fairness of trans-boundary river water resource allocations. We incorporate 
two principles from the International Water Law into our study. Though 
in almost all cases, the cooperation involving all relevant parities deliver 
maximum benefits, international agreements over trans-boundary river 
water resource allocation are often delayed. We explain this phenomenon 
from a bargaining perspective. Dam projects and the trans-boundary exter-
nalities of dam projects further complicate the international river sharing 
problem. The optimal dam plan and reasonable compensation plan because 
of the trans-boundary externalities of dam projects are investigated in this 
thesis. As a side project of this thesis, we examine the pricing issues in a 
two-sided market (for example, a shopping mall needs both consumers and 
product providers on board) by adding within-group externalities, i.e., 
members within the same group might exert externalities over others. 
